Files
elegalsoftware/docker-compose.yml
Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5 304f7f30c3 Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks
Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 13:34:33 -04:00

49 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML

# Optional Compose file for Dokploy's "Compose" deployment type.
#
# The RECOMMENDED path is a Dokploy "Application" pointed at this repo with build type = Dockerfile
# (Dokploy then manages Traefik routing, the domain, TLS, and env injection for you). This file is
# provided for teams who prefer a Compose deployment.
#
# Runtime env vars (DATABASE_URL, SESSION_SECRET, SPACES_*, etc.) come from Dokploy's Environment
# settings — do NOT hardcode them here. VITE_* values are build-time only (see build.args below).
services:
app:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile
args:
# Build-time public config inlined into the browser bundle by Vite.
VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY: ${VITE_TURNSTILE_SITE_KEY:-}
VITE_SENTRY_DSN: ${VITE_SENTRY_DSN:-}
restart: unless-stopped
# Resource guardrails so a memory leak or an upload/AI spike can't OOM the whole
# Dokploy host (a shared Swarm node). Dokploy applies Compose via Swarm-style deploy,
# so the limits/reservations below are the effective form. Tune the values as needed.
deploy:
resources:
limits:
cpus: "1.0"
memory: 1g
reservations:
memory: 512m
environment:
NODE_ENV: production
PORT: 8080
# All other runtime variables are injected by Dokploy (Environment settings). Keep the full
# list from .env.example in sync there: PUBLIC_URL, COOKIE_DOMAIN, SESSION_SECRET, CSRF_SECRET,
# SUPERADMIN_EMAILS, DATABASE_URL, DATABASE_CA_CERT_PATH, SPACES_*, SMTP2GO_API_KEY, EMAIL_FROM,
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY, STRIPE_*, SENTRY_DSN_API.
expose:
- "8080"
healthcheck:
test:
- CMD
- node
- -e
- "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/health').then(r=>{if(!r.ok)process.exit(1)}).catch(()=>process.exit(1))"
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 25s