elegalsoftware

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2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5	304f7f30c3	Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green: all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests, and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities. Dependencies (High): - Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier) and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime. AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002): - Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429), with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts). - Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow. Auth (defense-in-depth): - Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe). - Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification. Web: - Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only (open-redirect / phishing). Deploy hardening: - docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host. - .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin, migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts. - seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host. Webhooks / config: - Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking. - Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200. - Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite is hermetic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-17 13:34:33 -04:00
Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5	d1d96e4dd2	Dokploy deploy: Dockerfile, DB CA cert, blog images, CSP CI / build-and-test (push) Has been cancelled Details - Add Dockerfile (multi-stage Node 20), .dockerignore, docker-compose.yml, and DEPLOY-DOKPLOY.md for container deployment on Dokploy. - Commit the DigitalOcean managed-Postgres Project CA cert (certs/ca-certificate.crt) so production TLS verification (fail-closed) works in-container. Public CA, safe to commit. - Blog cover images served from DO Spaces; allow *.digitaloceanspaces.com in the prod CSP img-src. - Includes the AI (case summaries) and Cloudflare Turnstile bot-protection features. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-17 13:04:18 -04:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5

304f7f30c3

Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-17 13:34:33 -04:00

Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5

d1d96e4dd2

Dokploy deploy: Dockerfile, DB CA cert, blog images, CSP

CI / build-and-test (push) Has been cancelled

Details

- Add Dockerfile (multi-stage Node 20), .dockerignore, docker-compose.yml, and
  DEPLOY-DOKPLOY.md for container deployment on Dokploy.
- Commit the DigitalOcean managed-Postgres Project CA cert (certs/ca-certificate.crt)
  so production TLS verification (fail-closed) works in-container. Public CA, safe to commit.
- Blog cover images served from DO Spaces; allow *.digitaloceanspaces.com in the prod CSP img-src.
- Includes the AI (case summaries) and Cloudflare Turnstile bot-protection features.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-17 13:04:18 -04:00