Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Dockerfile

@@ -49,6 +49,17 @@ RUN apt-get update \
 
 # Bring over the fully-installed, already-built app (node_modules incl. the compiled argon2 binary
 # and workspace symlinks, apps/web/dist, TS source run by tsx, and certs/ if the CA cert is present).
+#
+# Attack-surface note / future hardening: the runtime executes TypeScript source directly through the
+# tsx ESM loader (see server.js), so this image MUST ship tsx (a prod dependency of apps/api) plus the
+# TS sources and the full node_modules from the builder. node_modules is copied whole rather than
+# pruned because tsx and its transitive prod deps are resolved at runtime, and an aggressive
+# `npm prune --omit=dev` here risks breaking that resolution — correctness of the running container
+# takes priority. The destructive operational scripts/ dir and test files are already excluded from
+# the build context (see .dockerignore), so they never reach this image.
+# Future improvement: precompile the API to plain JS (tsc/esbuild) in the builder stage and run it via
+# plain `node dist/server.js`. That removes the tsx runtime dependency and lets the runtime install
+# prod-only deps (`npm ci --omit=dev`), further shrinking the image and its attack surface.
 COPY --from=builder --chown=app:app /app /app
 
 USER app