Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/routes/auth.ts

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import {
   emailVerifications,
   sessions as sessionsTable,
 } from '@lawdesk/db';
-import { hashPassword, verifyPassword } from '../auth/password';
+import { hashPassword, verifyPasswordSafe } from '../auth/password';
 import { SESSION_COOKIE, createSession, destroySession } from '../auth/sessions';
 import { ensureSuperadminFlag } from '../auth/superadmin';
 import { generateCsrfToken } from '../auth/csrf';
@@ -167,7 +167,9 @@ export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance) {
 
     const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, body.email)).limit(1);
 
-    const ok = user ? await verifyPassword(user.passwordHash, body.password) : false;
+    // Always run an argon2 verify — against the real hash if the account exists, else against a
+    // dummy hash — so both paths take equal time and can't be used to enumerate valid emails.
+    const ok = await verifyPasswordSafe(user?.passwordHash, body.password);
 
     await db.insert(loginAttempts).values({ email: body.email, ip, success: ok });
 
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance) {
 
   app.get('/api/auth/me', async (req, reply) => {
     if (!req.user) return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'unauthorized' });
+    if (req.user.isSuspended) return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
     return { user: req.user };
   });
 
@@ -361,6 +364,7 @@ export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance) {
     { config: { rateLimit: { max: 3, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } } },
     async (req, reply) => {
       if (!req.user) return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'unauthorized' });
+      if (req.user.isSuspended) return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
 
       const db = getDb();
       const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, req.user.id)).limit(1);