Files
elegalsoftware/apps/api/src/routes/auth.ts
T
Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5 304f7f30c3 Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks
Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 13:34:33 -04:00

384 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from 'node:crypto';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { z } from 'zod';
import { and, eq, gte, isNull, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import {
getDb,
users,
firms,
loginAttempts,
passwordResets,
emailVerifications,
sessions as sessionsTable,
} from '@lawdesk/db';
import { hashPassword, verifyPasswordSafe } from '../auth/password';
import { SESSION_COOKIE, createSession, destroySession } from '../auth/sessions';
import { ensureSuperadminFlag } from '../auth/superadmin';
import { generateCsrfToken } from '../auth/csrf';
import {
sendEmail,
passwordResetEmail,
passwordChangedEmail,
welcomeEmail,
verifyEmailEmail,
} from '../lib/email';
import { env } from '../env';
import { verifyTurnstile } from '../lib/turnstile';
const signupBody = z.object({
email: z.string().email().max(254).toLowerCase().trim(),
password: z.string().min(10).max(200),
fullName: z.string().min(1).max(120).trim(),
firmName: z.string().min(1).max(160).trim(),
turnstileToken: z.string().max(3000).optional(),
});
const loginBody = z.object({
email: z.string().email().max(254).toLowerCase().trim(),
password: z.string().min(1).max(200),
turnstileToken: z.string().max(3000).optional(),
});
const MAX_FAILS_PER_15_MIN = 5;
// Mints an email-verification token (stored hashed, like password resets) and returns the
// clickable URL. The link hits the API directly — the vite dev proxy and the prod same-origin
// setup both route /api/* to this server.
async function createVerifyUrl(userId: string): Promise<string> {
const rawToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(rawToken).digest('hex');
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000); // 24 hours
await getDb().insert(emailVerifications).values({ tokenHash, userId, expiresAt });
return `${env.PUBLIC_URL}/api/auth/verify-email?token=${rawToken}`;
}
async function recentFailedAttempts(email: string, ip: string | null): Promise<number> {
const since = new Date(Date.now() - 15 * 60 * 1000);
const db = getDb();
const conditions = [
eq(loginAttempts.email, email),
eq(loginAttempts.success, false),
gte(loginAttempts.attemptedAt, since),
];
// Key the lockout on (email, ip). A single IP that keeps failing against an account gets
// throttled, but an attacker firing bad passwords from another IP can no longer lock the
// legitimate owner out of their own account (previously this counted by email alone).
if (ip) conditions.push(eq(loginAttempts.ip, ip));
const rows = await db
.select({ count: sql<number>`count(*)::int` })
.from(loginAttempts)
.where(and(...conditions));
return rows[0]?.count ?? 0;
}
export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance) {
app.post(
'/api/auth/signup',
{ config: { rateLimit: { max: 5, timeWindow: '1 hour' } } },
async (req, reply) => {
const body = signupBody.parse(req.body);
if (!(await verifyTurnstile(body.turnstileToken, req.ip))) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'captcha_failed' });
}
const db = getDb();
const existing = await db.select({ id: users.id }).from(users).where(eq(users.email, body.email)).limit(1);
if (existing.length > 0) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'email_taken' });
}
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(body.password);
const [firm] = await db.insert(firms).values({ name: body.firmName }).returning();
if (!firm) return reply.code(500).send({ error: 'firm_create_failed' });
const [user] = await db
.insert(users)
.values({
email: body.email,
passwordHash,
fullName: body.fullName,
firmId: firm.id,
role: 'owner',
})
.returning();
if (!user) return reply.code(500).send({ error: 'user_create_failed' });
const isSuperadmin = await ensureSuperadminFlag(
user.id,
user.email,
user.isSuperadmin,
user.emailVerifiedAt,
);
const { token, expiresAt } = await createSession({
userId: user.id,
ip: req.ip,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] ?? null,
});
app.setSessionCookie(reply, token, expiresAt);
app.setCsrfCookie(reply, generateCsrfToken());
// Fire-and-forget welcome email with a verification link (no blocking)
createVerifyUrl(user.id)
.catch((err) => {
app.log.warn({ err }, 'verify token create failed — sending welcome without link');
return null;
})
.then((verifyUrl) => {
const welcome = welcomeEmail(user.fullName, verifyUrl);
return sendEmail({ to: user.email, ...welcome });
})
.catch((err) => app.log.warn({ err }, 'welcome email failed'));
return reply.code(201).send({
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
fullName: user.fullName,
firmId: firm.id,
role: user.role,
isSuperadmin,
isSuspended: user.isSuspended,
emailVerified: Boolean(user.emailVerifiedAt),
},
});
});
app.post(
'/api/auth/login',
{ config: { rateLimit: { max: 10, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } } },
async (req, reply) => {
const body = loginBody.parse(req.body);
if (!(await verifyTurnstile(body.turnstileToken, req.ip))) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'captcha_failed' });
}
const db = getDb();
const ip = req.ip ?? null;
const fails = await recentFailedAttempts(body.email, ip);
if (fails >= MAX_FAILS_PER_15_MIN) {
return reply.code(429).send({ error: 'too_many_attempts' });
}
const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, body.email)).limit(1);
// Always run an argon2 verify — against the real hash if the account exists, else against a
// dummy hash — so both paths take equal time and can't be used to enumerate valid emails.
const ok = await verifyPasswordSafe(user?.passwordHash, body.password);
await db.insert(loginAttempts).values({ email: body.email, ip, success: ok });
if (!ok || !user) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'invalid_credentials' });
}
if (user.isSuspended) {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
}
const isSuperadmin = await ensureSuperadminFlag(
user.id,
user.email,
user.isSuperadmin,
user.emailVerifiedAt,
);
await db.update(users).set({ lastSeenAt: new Date() }).where(eq(users.id, user.id));
const { token, expiresAt } = await createSession({
userId: user.id,
ip,
userAgent: req.headers['user-agent'] ?? null,
});
app.setSessionCookie(reply, token, expiresAt);
app.setCsrfCookie(reply, generateCsrfToken());
return {
user: {
id: user.id,
email: user.email,
fullName: user.fullName,
firmId: user.firmId,
role: user.role,
isSuperadmin,
isSuspended: user.isSuspended,
emailVerified: Boolean(user.emailVerifiedAt),
},
};
});
app.post('/api/auth/logout', async (req, reply) => {
const token = req.cookies?.[SESSION_COOKIE];
if (token) await destroySession(token);
app.clearSessionCookie(reply);
app.clearCsrfCookie(reply);
return { ok: true };
});
app.get('/api/auth/me', async (req, reply) => {
if (!req.user) return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'unauthorized' });
if (req.user.isSuspended) return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
return { user: req.user };
});
// ─────────────────────────── Password reset ───────────────────────────
// Request a reset link. Always returns ok=true so an attacker can't enumerate emails.
app.post(
'/api/auth/request-password-reset',
{ config: { rateLimit: { max: 5, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } } },
async (req, reply) => {
const parsed = z
.object({
email: z.string().email().max(254).toLowerCase().trim(),
turnstileToken: z.string().max(3000).optional(),
})
.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return { ok: true };
// Bot check is orthogonal to email enumeration — a captcha failure is reported
// honestly; only account existence is concealed by the ok-always contract.
if (!(await verifyTurnstile(parsed.data.turnstileToken, req.ip))) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'captcha_failed' });
}
const db = getDb();
const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.email, parsed.data.email)).limit(1);
if (!user || user.isSuspended) return { ok: true };
const rawToken = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(rawToken).digest('hex');
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000); // 1 hour
await db.insert(passwordResets).values({ tokenHash, userId: user.id, expiresAt });
const resetUrl = `${env.PUBLIC_URL}/reset-password?token=${rawToken}`;
const tpl = passwordResetEmail(user.fullName, resetUrl);
sendEmail({ to: user.email, ...tpl }).catch((err) =>
app.log.warn({ err }, 'password reset email failed'),
);
return { ok: true };
},
);
// Apply a new password using the token from the email.
app.post(
'/api/auth/reset-password',
{ config: { rateLimit: { max: 10, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } } },
async (req, reply) => {
const parsed = z
.object({
token: z.string().min(20).max(200),
password: z.string().min(10).max(200),
})
.safeParse(req.body);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_input' });
const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(parsed.data.token).digest('hex');
const db = getDb();
const [reset] = await db
.select()
.from(passwordResets)
.where(and(eq(passwordResets.tokenHash, tokenHash), isNull(passwordResets.consumedAt)))
.limit(1);
if (!reset) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'invalid_or_used_token' });
if (reset.expiresAt.getTime() < Date.now()) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'token_expired' });
}
const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, reset.userId)).limit(1);
if (!user) return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'user_not_found' });
if (user.isSuspended) return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
const passwordHash = await hashPassword(parsed.data.password);
await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
await tx
.update(users)
.set({ passwordHash, updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(users.id, user.id));
await tx
.update(passwordResets)
.set({ consumedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(passwordResets.tokenHash, tokenHash));
// Revoke all existing sessions for this user — they should re-login with the new password
await tx.delete(sessionsTable).where(eq(sessionsTable.userId, user.id));
});
// Security notice — lets the real owner react fast if the reset wasn't theirs.
const tpl = passwordChangedEmail(user.fullName);
sendEmail({ to: user.email, ...tpl }).catch((err) =>
app.log.warn({ err }, 'password changed email failed'),
);
return { ok: true };
},
);
// ─────────────────────────── Email verification ───────────────────────────
// Landing endpoint for the link in welcome/verification emails. Redirects to the web app
// either way; ?verified=1|0 lets the UI show a toast.
app.get('/api/auth/verify-email', async (req, reply) => {
const parsed = z.object({ token: z.string().min(20).max(200) }).safeParse(req.query);
if (!parsed.success) return reply.redirect(`${env.PUBLIC_URL}/login?verified=0`);
const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(parsed.data.token).digest('hex');
const db = getDb();
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(emailVerifications)
.where(and(eq(emailVerifications.tokenHash, tokenHash), isNull(emailVerifications.consumedAt)))
.limit(1);
if (!row || row.expiresAt.getTime() < Date.now()) {
return reply.redirect(`${env.PUBLIC_URL}/login?verified=0`);
}
await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
await tx
.update(users)
.set({ emailVerifiedAt: new Date(), updatedAt: new Date() })
.where(and(eq(users.id, row.userId), isNull(users.emailVerifiedAt)));
await tx
.update(emailVerifications)
.set({ consumedAt: new Date() })
.where(eq(emailVerifications.tokenHash, tokenHash));
});
return reply.redirect(`${env.PUBLIC_URL}/login?verified=1`);
});
// Re-send the verification email for the logged-in user.
app.post(
'/api/auth/resend-verification',
{ config: { rateLimit: { max: 3, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } } },
async (req, reply) => {
if (!req.user) return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'unauthorized' });
if (req.user.isSuspended) return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'account_suspended' });
const db = getDb();
const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, req.user.id)).limit(1);
if (!user) return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'user_not_found' });
if (user.emailVerifiedAt) return { ok: true, alreadyVerified: true };
const verifyUrl = await createVerifyUrl(user.id);
const tpl = verifyEmailEmail(user.fullName, verifyUrl);
sendEmail({ to: user.email, ...tpl }).catch((err) =>
app.log.warn({ err }, 'verification email failed'),
);
return { ok: true };
},
);
}