4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Leon SerfatyandClaude Fable 5 5a555c715e Build GDPR compliance system: data export, account deletion, consent
- Data export (Art. 15/20): GET /api/gdpr/export serves a full JSON export
  of the user's data (credentials/tokens excluded, exclusions declared)
- Right to erasure (Art. 17): self-service deletion with 30-day grace
  period (Settings -> Privacy & Data), cancellable; daily /api/cron/gdpr
  drain cancels Stripe billing, purges Spaces files, cascade-deletes the
  account, anonymizes consent rows, and writes audit evidence
- Migration 0011: account_deletion_requests (partial unique index = one
  pending per user) + FK-less consent_log (survives erasure)
- Consent: terms/privacy acceptance logged at signup (email + Google);
  cookie banner with analytics opt-out (umami.disabled), choices logged
  server-side for signed-in users via POST /api/gdpr/consent
- Admin deleteUser upgraded to the same full purge (was leaving Spaces
  files and Stripe subscriptions orphaned)
- /gdpr legal page now points at the self-service tools
- scripts/verify-gdpr.ts: end-to-end verification vs live dev DB (22/22)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 06:03:27 -04:00
Leon SerfatyandClaude Opus 4.8 c9968531e4 Consolidate audit-fixes branch: webhooks, integrations, and deploy hardening
Batch commit of the pending working tree on security/audit-fixes-2026-07.
Major areas:
- Outbound webhooks / Zapier: schema + signed delivery with retries, public
  v1 API (REST-hook subscribe/unsubscribe), settings UI, cron drain.
- Deploy hardening: email via SMTP2GO (Resend fully removed), verified DB TLS
  (DATABASE_SSL=require + DATABASE_CA), storage fails loud in production when
  Spaces is unconfigured instead of silently using ephemeral disk.
- Integrations & features (concurrent work): accounting (QuickBooks/Xero),
  e-signature (DocuSign/Dropbox Sign), PayPal, geocoding/maps, onboarding,
  expanded legal pages.
- DB migrations 0006–0009.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 13:42:34 -04:00
Leon SerfatyandClaude Opus 4.8 969d5d4c8a Security hardening from 2026-07-01 audit
- Exclude supabase/ from Docker build context (leaked service_role key file)
- /api/files: exact per-user namespace match + reject path traversal;
  storage resolveKey rejects ".."/"." segments (fixes cross-user file read)
- Add ownsProperty/Unit/Tenant checks to tenants, maintenance (landlord path),
  and documents (JSON branch, now field-whitelisted) create handlers
- Escape user data in follow-up + payment-link emails (reuse escapeHtml)
- Neutralize CSV formula injection in toCsv + export routes
- Tighter sign-in rate limit (10/min); env-gated email verification + sender
- Per-request nonce CSP; drop script-src 'unsafe-inline' (styles unchanged)
- Add input length bounds; validate follow-ups POST body

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 13:56:34 -04:00
Leon SerfatyandClaude Opus 4.8 857b9a7811 Initial import: property management SaaS + security hardening + admin dashboard
Property Management Network — Next.js 16 (App Router), Better Auth,
Drizzle ORM over PostgreSQL, Stripe, OpenAI, Resend.

Includes:
- Security hardening: access-control/IDOR fixes, TLS-by-default DB layer,
  constant-time cron auth, strict security headers, atomic AI quota gating,
  HTML/email output encoding, demo-backdoor disabled in production.
- Superadmin dashboard at /admin (overview/MRR, server-paginated users with
  ban/impersonate/plan/delete, billing, platform activity + admin audit log,
  AI usage, system health) via the Better Auth admin plugin.
- Seed/migration utility scripts under scripts/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-23 20:36:07 -04:00