Security hardening from 2026-07-01 audit
- Exclude supabase/ from Docker build context (leaked service_role key file) - /api/files: exact per-user namespace match + reject path traversal; storage resolveKey rejects ".."/"." segments (fixes cross-user file read) - Add ownsProperty/Unit/Tenant checks to tenants, maintenance (landlord path), and documents (JSON branch, now field-whitelisted) create handlers - Escape user data in follow-up + payment-link emails (reuse escapeHtml) - Neutralize CSV formula injection in toCsv + export routes - Tighter sign-in rate limit (10/min); env-gated email verification + sender - Per-request nonce CSP; drop script-src 'unsafe-inline' (styles unchanged) - Add input length bounds; validate follow-ups POST body Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
co-authored by
Claude Opus 4.8
parent
857b9a7811
commit
969d5d4c8a
@@ -27,6 +27,27 @@ const PROTECTED_PATHS = [
|
||||
|
||||
const AUTH_PATHS = ["/login", "/signup", "/forgot-password"]
|
||||
|
||||
// Build the per-request Content-Security-Policy. `script-src` carries a
|
||||
// per-request nonce instead of 'unsafe-inline'. `style-src` keeps
|
||||
// 'unsafe-inline' because Radix / Tailwind / framer-motion inject inline
|
||||
// styles and removing it would break the UI. Next.js reads the nonce from the
|
||||
// `content-security-policy` request header and applies it to its own inline
|
||||
// scripts automatically.
|
||||
function buildCsp(nonce: string): string {
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"default-src 'self'",
|
||||
"img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
|
||||
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
|
||||
`script-src 'self' 'nonce-${nonce}' https://challenges.cloudflare.com`,
|
||||
"font-src 'self' data:",
|
||||
"connect-src 'self' https://api.stripe.com https://api.openai.com https://api.resend.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
|
||||
"frame-src https://js.stripe.com https://hooks.stripe.com https://challenges.cloudflare.com",
|
||||
"frame-ancestors 'none'",
|
||||
"base-uri 'self'",
|
||||
"form-action 'self'",
|
||||
].join("; ")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
|
||||
const pathname = request.nextUrl.pathname
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +69,21 @@ export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
|
||||
return NextResponse.redirect(url)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return NextResponse.next()
|
||||
// Per-request CSP nonce. UUID contains only hex + dashes, so it never
|
||||
// includes HTML-escape characters (which Next rejects in nonces).
|
||||
const nonce = crypto.randomUUID()
|
||||
const csp = buildCsp(nonce)
|
||||
|
||||
// Forward the nonce + CSP on the request headers so Next.js can pick up the
|
||||
// nonce and apply it to its own inline scripts during render.
|
||||
const requestHeaders = new Headers(request.headers)
|
||||
requestHeaders.set("x-nonce", nonce)
|
||||
requestHeaders.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp)
|
||||
|
||||
const response = NextResponse.next({ request: { headers: requestHeaders } })
|
||||
// Also set the CSP on the outgoing response so the browser enforces it.
|
||||
response.headers.set("Content-Security-Policy", csp)
|
||||
return response
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const config = {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user