Leon Serfaty
51c541ad22
Cross-cutting input-validation, isolation, and DoS-resistance fixes across the app, API, billing, queue, and infra layers. - Runtime validation (zod) for client-supplied admin actions (role/plan/ limits), series generation index, and all pg-boss queue payloads - Auth: require email verification before sign-in; reject weak/placeholder/ short BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in production - Billing: sanitize Stripe/PayPal errors (log server-side, generic to client); race-safe subscription upsert; only count "processed" webhook events as handled; verify org membership in getEffectivePlan to block plan escalation - Series generation: reserve usage up front and refund on failure; bill the owning org, not the caller's active org - Injection defenses: HTML-escape user fields in emails, strip CR/LF from subject/recipient, validate ElevenLabs voiceId before URL interpolation - Media routes: stream off disk instead of buffering whole files; rate-limit anonymous public audio/cover endpoints by client IP
65 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
65 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
import { Readable } from "node:stream";
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import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { rateLimit, LIMITS } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
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import { storage } from "@/lib/storage";
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export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
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const CONTENT_TYPES: Record<string, string> = {
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png: "image/png",
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jpg: "image/jpeg",
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jpeg: "image/jpeg",
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webp: "image/webp",
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};
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/** Best-effort client IP for anonymous rate limiting. */
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function clientKey(req: NextRequest): string {
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const fwd = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for");
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if (fwd) return fwd.split(",")[0].trim();
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return req.headers.get("x-real-ip") ?? "anon";
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}
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/**
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* Serve an episode's cover art to anonymous visitors, authorized by a valid,
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* still-enabled public `shareId`. Used as a fallback when the storage provider
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* doesn't expose a directly-fetchable public URL for cover art. The file is
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* streamed off disk rather than buffered whole to avoid memory-amplification DoS.
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*/
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export async function GET(
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req: NextRequest,
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{ params }: { params: Promise<{ shareId: string }> }
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) {
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// Rate-limit by client IP (never by shareId alone).
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const rl = await rateLimit("public-cover", clientKey(req), LIMITS.publicMedia);
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if (!rl.ok) {
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return new Response("Too many requests", {
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status: 429,
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headers: { "Retry-After": String(rl.retryAfterSec ?? 1) },
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});
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}
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const { shareId } = await params;
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const episode = await prisma.episode.findUnique({
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where: { shareId },
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select: { coverArt: { select: { storageKey: true } } },
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});
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const key = episode?.coverArt?.storageKey;
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if (!key) return new Response("Not found", { status: 404 });
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const total = await storage().size(key);
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if (total === null) return new Response("Not found", { status: 404 });
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const ext = key.split(".").pop()?.toLowerCase() ?? "png";
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const node = storage().createReadStream!(key);
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const body = Readable.toWeb(node as Readable) as unknown as BodyInit;
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return new Response(body, {
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headers: {
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"Content-Type": CONTENT_TYPES[ext] ?? "image/png",
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"Content-Length": String(total),
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"Cache-Control": "public, max-age=3600",
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},
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});
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}
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