51c541ad22
Cross-cutting input-validation, isolation, and DoS-resistance fixes across the app, API, billing, queue, and infra layers. - Runtime validation (zod) for client-supplied admin actions (role/plan/ limits), series generation index, and all pg-boss queue payloads - Auth: require email verification before sign-in; reject weak/placeholder/ short BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in production - Billing: sanitize Stripe/PayPal errors (log server-side, generic to client); race-safe subscription upsert; only count "processed" webhook events as handled; verify org membership in getEffectivePlan to block plan escalation - Series generation: reserve usage up front and refund on failure; bill the owning org, not the caller's active org - Injection defenses: HTML-escape user fields in emails, strip CR/LF from subject/recipient, validate ElevenLabs voiceId before URL interpolation - Media routes: stream off disk instead of buffering whole files; rate-limit anonymous public audio/cover endpoints by client IP
109 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
109 lines
3.7 KiB
TypeScript
import { betterAuth } from "better-auth";
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import { prismaAdapter } from "better-auth/adapters/prisma";
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import { admin, organization } from "better-auth/plugins";
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import { nextCookies } from "better-auth/next-js";
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import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
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import { sendEmail, emailLayout } from "@/lib/email";
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const appUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || "http://localhost:3000";
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const googleConfigured = !!(process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID && process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET);
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// Fail fast in production if the signing secret is missing, too short, or a known
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// placeholder — sessions/cookies are only secure when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is a strong,
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// non-default value. Stay frictionless in dev/test.
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const KNOWN_WEAK_SECRETS = new Set([
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"dev-secret-please-change-0123456789abcdef",
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]);
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const authSecret = process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET;
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const secretIsWeak =
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!authSecret || authSecret.length < 32 || KNOWN_WEAK_SECRETS.has(authSecret);
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if (secretIsWeak && process.env.NODE_ENV === "production") {
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throw new Error(
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"BETTER_AUTH_SECRET must be set in production to a strong value (>= 32 chars, not a known placeholder)."
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);
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}
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export const auth = betterAuth({
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appName: "Podcast Distribution AI",
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secret: process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
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baseURL: process.env.BETTER_AUTH_URL ?? appUrl,
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database: prismaAdapter(prisma, { provider: "postgresql" }),
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// Built-in brute-force protection for auth endpoints (login, password reset, etc).
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// 30 requests per 60s window per IP.
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rateLimit: { enabled: true, window: 60, max: 30 },
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emailAndPassword: {
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enabled: true,
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// SECURITY GATE: unverified emails CANNOT sign in. Verification emails are sent
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// on signup (see emailVerification.sendOnSignUp below), so users can verify before
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// their first login.
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requireEmailVerification: true,
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minPasswordLength: 8,
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async sendResetPassword({ user, url }) {
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await sendEmail({
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to: user.email,
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subject: "Reset your Podcast Distribution AI password",
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html: emailLayout(
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"Reset your password",
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"Click the button below to choose a new password.",
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{ label: "Reset password", url }
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),
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text: `Reset your password: ${url}`,
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});
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},
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},
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emailVerification: {
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sendOnSignUp: true,
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async sendVerificationEmail({ user, url }) {
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await sendEmail({
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to: user.email,
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subject: "Verify your email for Podcast Distribution AI",
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html: emailLayout(
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"Confirm your email",
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"Confirm your email address to secure your account.",
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{ label: "Verify email", url }
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),
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text: `Verify your email: ${url}`,
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});
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},
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},
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socialProviders: googleConfigured
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? {
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google: {
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clientId: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID!,
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clientSecret: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET!,
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},
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}
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: undefined,
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session: {
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expiresIn: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30, // 30 days
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updateAge: 60 * 60 * 24, // refresh daily
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// Cache the session in a signed cookie to avoid a DB hit on every request.
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// Tradeoff: a banned/demoted user keeps cached access until the cache expires,
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// so we keep the window short (60s). Shorter = faster revocation but more DB hits.
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cookieCache: { enabled: true, maxAge: 60 },
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},
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account: {
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accountLinking: { enabled: true, trustedProviders: ["google"] },
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},
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plugins: [
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admin({ defaultRole: "user", adminRoles: ["admin"] }),
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organization({
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teams: { enabled: true, maximumTeams: 1 },
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// Agency seat cap is enforced in app logic against the subscription's seat count.
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membershipLimit: 5,
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}),
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// Must remain last: lets Server Actions / route handlers set auth cookies.
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nextCookies(),
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],
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});
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export type Session = typeof auth.$Infer.Session;
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