Security & robustness hardening pass
Cross-cutting input-validation, isolation, and DoS-resistance fixes across the app, API, billing, queue, and infra layers. - Runtime validation (zod) for client-supplied admin actions (role/plan/ limits), series generation index, and all pg-boss queue payloads - Auth: require email verification before sign-in; reject weak/placeholder/ short BETTER_AUTH_SECRET in production - Billing: sanitize Stripe/PayPal errors (log server-side, generic to client); race-safe subscription upsert; only count "processed" webhook events as handled; verify org membership in getEffectivePlan to block plan escalation - Series generation: reserve usage up front and refund on failure; bill the owning org, not the caller's active org - Injection defenses: HTML-escape user fields in emails, strip CR/LF from subject/recipient, validate ElevenLabs voiceId before URL interpolation - Media routes: stream off disk instead of buffering whole files; rate-limit anonymous public audio/cover endpoints by client IP
This commit is contained in:
+17
-9
@@ -9,10 +9,19 @@ const appUrl = process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL || "http://localhost:3000";
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const googleConfigured = !!(process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID && process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET);
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// Fail fast in production if the signing secret is missing — sessions/cookies are
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// only secure when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is set. Stay frictionless in dev/test.
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if (!process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET && process.env.NODE_ENV === "production") {
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throw new Error("BETTER_AUTH_SECRET must be set in production.");
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// Fail fast in production if the signing secret is missing, too short, or a known
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// placeholder — sessions/cookies are only secure when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is a strong,
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// non-default value. Stay frictionless in dev/test.
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const KNOWN_WEAK_SECRETS = new Set([
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"dev-secret-please-change-0123456789abcdef",
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]);
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const authSecret = process.env.BETTER_AUTH_SECRET;
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const secretIsWeak =
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!authSecret || authSecret.length < 32 || KNOWN_WEAK_SECRETS.has(authSecret);
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if (secretIsWeak && process.env.NODE_ENV === "production") {
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throw new Error(
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"BETTER_AUTH_SECRET must be set in production to a strong value (>= 32 chars, not a known placeholder)."
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);
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}
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export const auth = betterAuth({
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@@ -27,11 +36,10 @@ export const auth = betterAuth({
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emailAndPassword: {
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enabled: true,
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// SECURITY GATE (currently OPEN): unverified emails can sign in. Flip this to
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// `true` once email delivery is confirmed working in prod. Left `false` for now
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// so existing dev accounts aren't locked out. Verification emails ARE sent on
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// signup (see emailVerification.sendOnSignUp below), so users can verify already.
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requireEmailVerification: false,
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// SECURITY GATE: unverified emails CANNOT sign in. Verification emails are sent
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// on signup (see emailVerification.sendOnSignUp below), so users can verify before
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// their first login.
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requireEmailVerification: true,
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minPasswordLength: 8,
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async sendResetPassword({ user, url }) {
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await sendEmail({
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