Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/web/src/pages/LoginPage.tsx

@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ const schema = z.object({
 
 type FormValues = z.infer<typeof schema>;
 
+// Guard against open-redirects: only accept same-origin internal paths like
+// "/app" or "/app/cases". Reject protocol-relative ("//evil.com"), backslash
+// tricks ("/\\evil.com"), and absolute URLs ("https://evil.com").
+function safeNext(raw: string | null): string {
+  if (!raw || !raw.startsWith('/') || raw.startsWith('//') || raw.startsWith('/\\') || raw.includes('://')) {
+    return '/app';
+  }
+  return raw;
+}
+
 const ERROR_COPY: Record<string, string> = {
   invalid_credentials: 'Email or password is incorrect.',
   too_many_attempts: 'Too many attempts. Try again in a few minutes.',
@@ -54,7 +64,7 @@ export default function LoginPage() {
       setCaptchaReset((n) => n + 1);
       return;
     }
-    const next = new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('next') ?? '/app';
+    const next = safeNext(new URLSearchParams(location.search).get('next'));
     navigate(next, { replace: true });
   }