Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

apps/api/src/env.ts

@@ -4,8 +4,12 @@ import dotenv from 'dotenv';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 
 const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
-// Load .env from the monorepo root regardless of cwd
-dotenv.config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../.env') });
+// Load .env from the monorepo root regardless of cwd — but NEVER under test. The test suites
+// inject their own env explicitly; loading a developer's/CI's real .env here makes tests
+// non-hermetic (e.g. a real TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY would switch on CAPTCHA and break auth tests).
+if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'test') {
+  dotenv.config({ path: path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../.env') });
+}
 
 const envSchema = z.object({
   NODE_ENV: z.enum(['development', 'production', 'test']).default('development'),
@@ -41,6 +45,15 @@ const envSchema = z.object({
 
 const parsed = envSchema.parse(process.env);
 
+// Production guard: Turnstile bot protection fails open when TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is unset
+// (correct for dev/test, but in production a forgotten key silently disables all CAPTCHA/bot
+// protection on signup/login/password-reset/contact). Fail fast at boot rather than run exposed.
+if (parsed.NODE_ENV === 'production' && !parsed.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY) {
+  throw new Error(
+    'TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY is required in production: without it, bot protection fails open and CAPTCHA verification is skipped entirely. Set TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in the environment.',
+  );
+}
+
 export const env = {
   ...parsed,
   superadminEmails: parsed.SUPERADMIN_EMAILS.split(',')