Security hardening: deps, tenancy quotas, auth, deploy, webhooks

Addresses the findings from the platform security audit. Verified green:
all-workspace typecheck, web build, 16 API unit tests, 23 e2e auth tests,
and 0 high/critical production dependency vulnerabilities.

Dependencies (High):
- Bump drizzle-orm 0.36→0.45.2 (GHSA-gpj5-g38j-94v9 SQLi-via-identifier)
  and drizzle-kit→0.31.10; npm audit fix cleared fast-uri path-traversal
  and the react-router open-redirect. Remaining audit items are dev-only
  build tooling (esbuild/vite), not shipped at runtime.

AI cost control + storage quota (new ai_usage table, migration 0002):
- Per-firm monthly AI token budget enforced before each completion (429),
  with every completion recorded to an ai_usage ledger (lib/ai-usage.ts).
- Enforce per-plan storage quota on upload (402) and maintain
  storage_bytes_used on upload/delete (lib/storage-quota.ts); widen the
  column int→bigint so 8GB/50GB plans don't overflow.

Auth (defense-in-depth):
- Constant-time login: verify against a dummy argon2 hash when the account
  doesn't exist, closing the timing/enumeration oracle (verifyPasswordSafe).
- Enforce suspension on requireSuperadmin, /auth/me, /auth/resend-verification.

Web:
- Validate the post-login ?next= redirect to same-origin paths only
  (open-redirect / phishing).

Deploy hardening:
- docker-compose: memory/CPU limits so a spike can't OOM the Dokploy host.
- .dockerignore: keep destructive one-off scripts (seed-demo, create-admin,
  migrate-storage) out of the runtime image; retain the cron scripts.
- seed-demo.ts: hard-refuse NODE_ENV=production and the prod DB host.

Webhooks / config:
- Stripe idempotency via a stripe_events ledger (skip already-processed
  events; record only after successful processing so a transient failure
  still retries); make the plan-upgraded email non-blocking.
- Rate-limit account export and invoice PDF; cap invoice item arrays at 200.
- Require TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY in production (bot protection no longer fails
  open on a forgotten key); don't load .env under NODE_ENV=test so the suite
  is hermetic.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.dockerignore

@@ -34,9 +34,26 @@ tmp
 storage
 uploads
 
-# Tests aren't needed in the runtime image.
+# Tests and test tooling aren't needed in the runtime image.
 apps/api/test
 **/*.test.ts
+**/*.spec.ts
+**/vitest.config.ts
+**/vitest.*.config.ts
+
+# Destructive/privileged one-off scripts must NOT ship in the runtime image: an attacker with
+# code-exec in the container has DATABASE_URL in-env, so keeping these off disk removes the sharpest
+# RCE-amplification tools. Root-anchored to the top-level scripts/ only (apps/web/scripts, used by the
+# web build, is a different directory and is kept). DB migrations run via `npm run db:migrate`
+# (packages/db), not from scripts/, so this does not affect builds or deploys.
+#
+# The routine, non-destructive cron scripts (retention-sweep, send-overdue-reminders,
+# sweep-orphaned-storage) are intentionally KEPT so Dokploy scheduled jobs can invoke them inside
+# the container (e.g. `npm run cron:retention`, which enforces Privacy-Policy retention windows).
+/scripts/seed-demo.ts
+/scripts/create-admin.ts
+/scripts/migrate-storage-to-spaces.ts
+/scripts/plesk-deploy.sh
 
 # Note: certs/ is intentionally NOT ignored — the Postgres CA cert (if committed) is baked in
 # so production TLS verification works. See DEPLOY-DOKPLOY.md.